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  Spitting Bullets: Anger’s Long-Ignored Role in Reactions to Terror: An Examination of  
College Students’ Fear and Anger Responses to Terrorism 
 
One of the terrorism’s primary goals is to promote a social and political agenda by 
inducing fear and terror in a specific population.1  The terrorist attacks on September 11, 2011 
(9/11) are the most well-known terrorist attacks in American history, which took the lives of over 
3000 people and caused inconceivable property while the world watched on television. The 9/11 
attacks spurred a shift in government and public policy, changed public opinion towards the 
government, and led to a marked economic decline in the United States.2  
In the years since 9/11, interest in terrorism has continued to be a critical area of 
scholarship, and a topic of utmost government concern.3 Researchers such as Larry Gaines and 
Victor Kappeler argue that one of the most significant costs of 9/11 was the the American 
public’s increased fear of terrorism, a view reflected in public opinion surveys.4 A recent Gallup 
poll, Terrorism in the United States, found the fear of terrorism, which peaked post 9/11 and then 
gradually receded, has in the last few years once again begun to spike.5 Furthermore, relative to 
fear of common street crimes (a much more likely occurrence),6 fear of terrorism is significantly 
higher in the general public.7  
Terrorism and fear are inextricably linked in most people's minds. As previously stated, 
terrorists' goals, are to instill fear in a mass population. This serves as the definition of terrorism 
to some.8 While the beheadings and mass executions of ISIS broadcast for the world to see are 
certainly meant to instill fear, they are also meant to provoke Western governments into angry 
responses, such as clamping down on local Muslim populations or bombing distant Muslim 
lands. Indeed, Osama bin-Laden’s plan with the 9/11 attacks was to lead America into a series of 
“bleeding wars” that would weaken the superpower.9 Even the etymology of the term "terrorism" 
evokes fear due to the word being rooted in the term "terror.”10  
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This paper argues that many of the negative aspects of responses to terrorism come from 
the anger that terrorism invokes in victim populations. Anger elicits the desire for revenge in the 
victim population as well as distrust of the terrorists' co-ethnics. Angry responses tend to be 
quick and harsh; anger is rarely described as a particular or deliberate emotion. As shown time 
and again in both academic and mainstream works, emotional waves overtake mass publics after 
medium-to- large-scale terror attacks. These emotional waves can be manipulated by government 
leaders to justify military actions and reductions in civil liberties.11  
While fear has been repeatedly pointed to as a central component in reactions to terror 
attacks (a questioner asked the historian Eric Foner at a post-9/11 lecture if Foner believed that 
“fear conquers freedom”), anger has mainly been ignored.12 The criminal justice literature 
clearly shows that anger—embodied by a desire for retribution—at the accused leads to harsh 
penalties.13 The terrorism literature mostly skips over anger's role in terrorists' goals and targeted 
governments responses. This demonstrates the need to understand further how the public 
responds to these attacks, which in turn calls on governments to take action.  
Ideologically, democratic governments seek to reflect and represent the fears, wishes, and 
desires of their populaces. This study seeks to capture the responses of regular Americans to 
explore if the role of anger in responses to terror attacks, with the goal of answering two related 
questions: 1) Is anger an essential emotion in public reactions to terror attacks? and 2) What are 
the ramifications of including anger in a model of public reactions to terrorism? To answer these 
questions this study reviews the current work on anger's connection to terrorism and conducts a 
student survey, with the hopes of a national survey in the future, to see if anger is indeed a 
worthy area of study in the field of terrorism studies. This paper demonstrates that terrorists want 
us angry because those that are angry are prone to overreaction, which can make the terrorists 
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look like the real victims. As such, anger should be a central component of our understanding of 
responses to terrorism. 
 This article studies a sample of college students—an important demographic to 
examine—as college communities view the fear of terrorism and perceived risk of victimization 
as critical concerns for students, staff, and faculty.14 Furthermore, while students are not current 
practitioners or policymakers, they will be in the future. Understanding how a fear of terrorism 
shapes the emotional response of this population may provide valuable insights into how they 
will react in the future when they are policymakers and practitioners.  The pages that follow 
present a review of the subject in recent scholarly works and examine empirical evidence and 
prior public opinion studies, all of which will be followed by the presentation of the survey, 
results, and policy implications.  
Literature Review 
  Historically, the United States was geographically isolated from significant acts of 
terrorism. As such, many young Americans have little exposure to terrorism and political 
violence.15  Unlike in some other nations that have endured a lengthy history of terrorist attacks 
and violence, fear of terrorism is a relatively new experience for many American citizens.16 It 
was not until the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center and the 1996 bombings of the Alfred 
P. Murrah building in Oklahoma City and Olympic Park in Atlanta that terrorism hit home for 
many Americans.17 Since the 9/11 attacks, scholars have primarily focused their attention on the 
social and psychological impact of these attacks on Americans, such as stress and anxiety post-
9/11,18 the role of proximity of residents to a terrorist attack, and higher levels of psychological 
distress.19 Before 9/11, research in the area of the impact of terrorist attacks on the public 
focused mostly on posttraumatic stress disorders in those present at attacks.20  
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In the time since 9/11, ample scholarship has focused on the role of sociodemographic 
variables, such as age, gender, and race in response to terrorism. For example, in their 2006 
study, Joseph Boscarino, Sandro Galea, and Edna Foa utilized Terrorism Management Theory 
(TMT) to examine preparedness for terrorist attacks. TMT is rooted in the notion that people are 
motivated to survive, but are also aware of their inevitable mortality—leading to anxiety—while 
strong attachment to a cultural worldview acts to protect against this anxiety. The authors 
examined more than 1,600 people who were living in New York City on the day of the 9/11 
attacks to gauge their level of concern and preparedness for fear of another terrorist attack. 
Boscarino et al.'s findings found being African American, Hispanic, female, or having a lower 
level of education related to higher level of fears of terrorism, with African American and 
Korean Americans reporting higher levels of concern about terrorism.21 These findings suggest 
demographic characteristics influence concern and fear about terrorism. These factors could be 
integrated into TMT to target specific groups in regards to preparedness for terrorist attacks. 
Other studies support these findings, such as a 2009 study by David Eisenman et al., which 
looked at the influence of being a vulnerable group and perception of personal risk of terrorism.22 
This study found race influenced responses to the threat of terrorism, supporting the notion of the 
importance of sociodemographic factors to understanding responses to terrorism. Christopher 
Salvatore and Brian Gorman focused on gender and fear of terrorism in their 2006 study. Results 
of said study found that gender-based fear of terrorism closely mirrors the higher levels of fear 
females express in regards to other types of crime. This finding may be of particular note, as 
women could be targeted for prevention and preparedness strategies for terrorist attacks, as well 
and treatment programs are targeting those dealing with high levels of stress, fear, and anxiety 
due to the potential for or as a result of, terrorist attacks.23 In a more recent study, Christopher 
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Salvatore and Gabriel Rubin used data from the General Social Survey (GSS) collected post 9/11 
to examine individual-level protective actions to a future terrorist attack and the perceived 
effectiveness of these actions. Their study found several factors—including race and gender—
influence responses to and perceived effectiveness of those responses.24 The literature supports 
the importance of examining sociodemographic factors like race and gender in order to have a 
solid grasp on how a population responds to terrorism. To fully understand the role of specific 
emotional responses—in this case, anger and fear—they must first be defined. 
Definitions and Ramifications of Anger and Fear 
As George Marcus stated, "Understanding emotion has for a very long time been central 
to the ongoing attempt to understand human nature."25 While it may sound simple, the concept of 
emotion is hard to pin down. Though fear is a common term whose definition seems obvious, it 
seems that authors that have studied responses to terror have grouped too broad an emotional 
range under the label "fear." To this end, it is important to define fear26 and anger. Scholars that 
study emotions differentiate them by five characteristics: arousal, expression, feeling, cognitive 
antecedent, and action tendency.27 For this paper, the latter two characteristics are most 
important.   
In defining anger, Roger Petersen and Sarah Zukerman argue that a critical cognitive 
component of anger is the notion that an individual or group perpetrated a blameworthy action 
against one's self or group.28 As such, the corresponding tendency is to exact revenge by 
punishing the perpetrating group or individual.29 In terms of how anger impacts our responses, 
anger makes risky behaviors look less risky.  For example, Leonie Huddy, Stanley Feldman, 
Charles Taber, and Gallya Lahav state, “Anxiety commonly produces an overestimation of risk 
and thus risk-averse behavior.… In contrast, anger tends to decrease perceived threat and leads to 
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heightened risk-taking behavior.”30 In addition to influencing perceptions of risk, anger causes 
increased prejudices and stereotyping; these may lead to feelings of superiority to the people or 
groups who are viewed as victimizing them, and in turn influence acts of vengeance in which 
they perceive themselves as better than the group that made them feel “less.” Revenge also 
instills a sense of power and control for the victimized group or party. However, relative to fear’s 
reasonably slow decline, scholars have found that anger can spike quickly, but decreases at a 
much slower rate.31  
This view of anger links well to the social psychologist's theory of frustration-aggression, 
which states aggression or violence can be explained by the aggressive actor's feelings of 
frustration.32 Frustration, of course, can be equated with anger as it arises due to a person feeling 
that an injustice has occurred and that some external factor is to blame. Further, the excitation-
transfer theory of aggression also supports an angry response to terrorism. According to this 
theory, specific events physiologically arouse people and, for those events that anger, residual 
arousal (in the form of a residual physiological response such as an elevated heartbeat) can lead 
to lashing out at others even when they are not to blame for our initial anger.33 In other words, 
anger causes one to seek vengeance, to “even the score”; fear causes a person to perceive even 
innocuous situations as threatening.  Contrary to anger, fear makes an individual or group feel 
like their life or well-being is being threatened.  People hide from or avoid things that they fear.  
As Smith states, assessments of within-group strength cause people to respond to inter-group 
conflict with anger and confrontation, whereas appraisals of in-group weakness lead people to 
respond to inter-group conflict with fear and avoidance.34  Furthermore, Mackie, Devos, and 
Smith find that when insulted by an out-group member, angry responses predicted confrontation 
while fearful responses predicted avoidance.35 
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Emotional Responses to Terrorism: Fear and Anger 
Terrorist attacks prompt significant fear and anger in the populations who experience 
them. As expected, prior studies found that there are a marked range of emotional responses to 
terrorist attacks. For example, in their study of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD)—which 
was prevalent throughout the United States as a result of the 9/11 attack—Silver, Holman, 
McIntosh, Poulin, and Gil-Rivas found long-term problems may result from terrorism-based 
victimization.36 PTSD symptoms vary but often include difficulty concentrating, angry outbursts, 
difficulty sleeping, nightmares, and anxiety.37 Other studies strongly support fear and anger to be 
common emotional responses to terrorism.38 
Emotional responses to events can be mixed, and that is the point. Too much of the 
terrorism literature focuses on fear and ignores anger. Both responses, in addition to other 
emotions, are present in response to terrorism and the presence of anger has significant 
ramifications for the study of responses to terror attacks. To date, research on emotional 
responses to terror attacks has primarily focused on public fear's role in the post-terror attack 
process.  Typically, the concept of mass fear is measured by looking at the percentage of people 
in a given country fearful of terrorism.  This fear is then typically linked to public approval for 
civil liberty abridgments or heightened security.39 Studies show that fear guides the individual to 
seek guidance from his leaders.  As Clemente and Kleiman underline, fear need not be based 
upon any real threat, making the perception of danger fomented by seemingly random terrorist 
attacks so inimical to democracy.40    
The existing models, thus, could be structured with an exogenous terror attack leading to 
mass fear which is then manipulated by government elites to push a range of counterterror 
policies such as “enhanced interrogation,” reductions in privacy rights and other civil liberties, 
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extended detention for terrorists, or even war. Here the level of mass fear is a constraint on 
government action since, presumably, if fear did not go up—or did not go up sufficiently, the 
government would be restrained in its action. Fear alone is thus the catalyst, precursor or 
lubricant that yields policy changes.  
As discussed above, people responded with a wide range of emotions after the September 
11 attacks; anger was particularly salient.  A University of Chicago study conducted in the days 
and weeks after the attacks found that "the dominant reaction [to the attacks] was anger," with 65 
percent of respondents answering in this way.  New York residents, 73 percent of whom reported 
experiencing anger after the attacks, were even more filled with rage.41 More evidence for the 
salience of anger comes from Lerner, Gonzalez, Small, and Fischoff, who establish that in the 
immediate aftermath of 9/11 (they polled study participants on September 20 and November 10, 
2001), participants self-reported themselves as being markedly more angry than fearful, on 
average.  Their study also found that people viewed the world as a less risky one when they were 
angry and a more risky one (a world full of threats) when fearful. 42  
Anger's role in terrorism should be evident given that anger is an emotion felt when 
people feel that someone else is responsible for an injustice occurring. Studies demonstrate that 
an angry citizenry is more willing to support counterterrorism policies43 and to oppose 
immigrants.44  Friedland and Merari found that terror attacks “hardened” Israelis’ attitudes 
towards terror groups and Palestinians, an example of such an emotion response.45 Social 
scientists have long used the term “hardening of attitudes” as a euphemism for the emotion of 
anger.46  As Friedland and Merari’s polling study found, “there was no evidence of any 
willingness [on Israelis’ part] to concede to terrorists.”47  Indeed, the opposite was true. Will 
Josiger shows that the second intifada only served to make Israelis see the prospects of peace as 
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increasingly dismal.48  If fear were at work here, perhaps it could be argued that Israelis would 
seek peace to stop the violence against them.  Instead, here anger is supported by the "hardening" 
of Israeli attitudes, i.e., their anger. If terrorism only elicited fear, then peace might be a likely 
outcome to an extended terror campaign as Israelis might cede to their fears. Instead, peace 
becomes less likely in the Israeli public's view due to anger directed at the terror campaign being 
fought against them.   
 Roger Giner-Sorolla and Angela Maitner note that descriptions of terrorism evinced 
anger when feelings of injustice were provoked in both British and American subjects.49 By 
contrast, when the terrorist group was seen as authoritative, the subjects in both the British and 
American groups felt more fearful. More recently, Kim found that there is a relationship between 
collective anger in response to a terrorist attack and an individual's anger level, suggesting there 
is a relationship between societal level responses to terrorism and how individuals emotionally 
react.50 This may have significant implications for support of counter-terrorism policies such as 
the Patriot Act. The link between feelings of injustice and anger is crucial because crimes and 
terrorism frequently elicit feelings that something unjust has occurred in the eyes of the victims. 
This means that the phenomenon of anger as an emotional response to terrorism must be an 
important and frequently occurring one. This may be of particular relevance when examining 
samples of college students as they are being socialized during an era of heightened awareness, 
fear, and anger in response to the threat of terrorism. 
Scholars argue that college students are a population who are especially emotionally 
vulnerable to terrorist attacks.51 College is a challenging development period for many. College-
age youth who experience terrorist attacks have increased levels of anxiety about future attacks. 
For example, Bosco and Harvey state, "Millennials will feel the impact even if they do not recall 
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the event, because they will see the after effects. Things will be different for their everyday lives 
even though they may not connect everything with 9/11."52 In other words, college-aged students 
live in a world transformed by the fear and anxiety around the prospect of another terrorist event 
such as 9/11.  Moreover, college students are the next generation of practitioners in fields such as 
criminal justice, medicine, and others who will be tasked with responding to terrorist attacks, as 
well as being the next generation of legislators and politicians who will respond to the public's 
anxieties and concerns regarding the threat of terrorism. As such it is essential to understand how 
fear and anger impact college students’ responses to terrorism. 
Methodology 
The purpose of this study is to explore if anger is as important an emotional response as 
fear for survey respondents' reactions to terrorist violence. This study is exploratory, seeking to 
serve as a pilot study that can generate a greater understanding of anger based responses to 
terrorism. As stated in the introduction, this study sought to decipher whether anger is an 
essential variable for study in regards to the terror threat and the ramifications of inclusion of 
anger in this area of research. 
The sample is a convenience sample of college undergraduates located at a university in 
the Eastern area of the United States. Payne and Chappel examine the benefits and weaknesses of 
utilizing students for survey-based studies. Benefits including the ease of access to student 
samples, the time and cost efficiency of using students, and relative ease of measuring change 
with a student sample.  Additionally, the authors note that while student data is not generalizable 
as a national random sample, students do reflect the society and culture in which they live. 
Further, demographic factors make students more likely to be involved and impacted by crime 
and related issues, and the utilization of students for survey-based studies can be a beneficial 
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learning experience, giving them first-hand experience with being a subject in a research study.53   
Payne and Chappel also identify four fundamental weaknesses with the use of students' samples.  
The first concern is validity issues, as students may be subjected to a series of surveys from 
several projects throughout a semester. As such, factors such as fatigue or boredom may set in, 
and as Payne and Chappel state, those conducting studies have to question how seriously the 
students may take their responses. Second, there is the concern of social desirability, in particular 
as related to crime, victimization, and other sensitive topics. Students may feel compelled to 
provide the answers that are socially desirable, in this case, what their professor or the researcher 
may want. Third, there is a stigma attached to using students as samples. However, a variety of 
highly ranked journals in social science (e.g., Criminal Justice and Behavior, Journal of 
Criminal Justice Education, Criminology) publish studies utilizing student based samples.  
Finally, there are concerns related to generalizability. Students are part of the general population, 
however relative to the general population they typically are younger, have different income 
levels, a distinct subculture, and different life experiences.54 Despite these concerns, college 
students do represent America’s future leaders, a fact that mitigates some of the above concerns 
about surveying them. Deciphering how these future leaders react emotionally to terrorism 
certainly represents an important research goal. 
 Unlike victimization or crime base survey, the current study does not seek to examine 
the specific behavior of the students themselves but rather their attitudes and responses to 
scenarios, therefore limiting the impact of social desirability in responses. It should also be noted 
that none of the students surveyed were in classes taught by the authors and the surveys were 
distributed by research assistants, reducing some of the potential bias concerns. 
 Since data on people's fear-based reactions to terrorism is extensive but data is sparse for 
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their anger-based reactions, the authors constructed a survey on how people react emotionally to 
terrorism.  The survey sought to compare those who responded with fear to those who responded 
with anger.    
The survey was conducted using the unobtrusive split-third survey methodology 
employed by Kuklinski et al., because it was posited that respondents might falsify their 
emotional responses for reasons of social desirability bias.55  Survey respondents were randomly 
assigned to three groups.  All of the groups were primed by viewing a two-minute video that 
depicts terrorist violence from around the world (including images of September 11 th, the 
aftermath of the 2005 London bombings, and terror victims in Israel).   
Each group then received a survey that asked them five questions with the following 
prompt: "After watching the video, indicate how many of the statements below you agree.  Don't 
choose which ones you agree with, only write how many you agree with on the blank line." The 
method is meant to get people to agree to statements that they might not otherwise agree with if 
they knew that their responses were known.  Each question has three general statements about 
terrorism that are meant to be innocuous.  The first group of survey takers is a baseline group; 
the baseline group's questions only contain the three generic statements about terrorism.  This 
group is meant to exhibit how many of the generic responses the average respondent will agree.  
The next two groups are given the same survey with the same five questions—with one 
fundamental difference.  The second group gets the same survey as the baseline group with an 
additional response choice for each question meant to measure their fear response.   The third 
group also gets the same survey as the baseline group but this time with an additional response 
choice meant to measure their anger response.  The average response rates for each question are 
then compared using simple ANOVA (analysis of variance) statistical analysis. 
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To illustrate, the first question on the baseline survey has the following three statements: 
"A terrorist's conception of religion is distorted;" "The September 11 attacks changed the world 
forever;" and "Terrorism has increased dramatically over the past several years."  In the fear 
survey, a fourth statement is added: "Sometimes it is necessary to give up some individual rights 
to make it easier for the government to combat terrorism."  By comparing the average number of 
statements respondents agreed within the baseline survey to the average number of statements 
agreed with by respondents in the anger and fear surveys, it can be inferred whether or not the 
fourth statement was, in general, agreed to or not.  For instance, if the average baseline response 
to question 1 was agreement with two statements and the average fear response to question 1 was 
agreement with three statements, then it can be surmised that the extra "fear" statement was 
generally agreed to. 
One hundred sixty-six survey respondents completed the surveys between February and 
April of 2010—fifty-five baseline surveys were completed, fifty-four anger surveys, and fifty-
seven fear surveys.  All of the survey respondents were undergraduate students at a univers ity in 
the Eastern United States where the survey received approval from the Institutional Review 
Board. The gender breakdown was close—seventy-five males and eighty females (eleven 
respondents chose not to answer the gender question).  The mean age of the respondents was 
20.1 years old.  53.9 percent of the respondents were white, 10.2 percent were African American, 
12.6 percent Hispanic, and 23.3 percent other ethnicities or no-responses.  These percentages 
roughly hewed to the make-up of the university at the time, though more recently the university 
has shifted to a greater proportion of Hispanic students. The proportion of female students at the 
university is also greater than that of the attained sample. Political views leaned left: 72 
respondents said they were liberal (43.1 percent), 62 said they were moderates (37.1 percent), 
13
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and 22 described themselves as conservatives (13.2 percent).    
Results 
 As expected, both the fear and anger survey responses were different from the responses 
on the baseline survey—and those differences were statistically significant.  However, there were 
no statistically significant differences found between the fear and angler surveys.  That means 
that survey respondents were just as likely to respond with anger to the video on terrorism as 
they were with fear.  The number of statements that the average fear survey respondent agreed 
with overall was almost the same as the number of statements the average anger survey 
respondent agreed.     
Chart 1: Likelihood of Peace between Israelis and Palestinians56  
 
The three groups of survey respondents (baseline group, anger group, and fear group) 
were similar regarding gender, age and ethnicity.  On political view, however, there was an 
interesting divergence.  A full half of the survey respondents that described themselves as 
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"conservative" took the anger survey.  Though conservatives were still the smallest group, it 
could be that people were labeling themselves conservative due to an artifact of the survey 
method.  This was posited because respondents were asked about their political view after they 
answered questions about their views on terrorism.  The anger surveys added responses tilt 
decidedly conservatively and reading these responses may have moved the opinion of 
respondents. 
 To give a more fine-grained analysis, the data for all five questions appear below: 
Chart 2: Comparison of Three Survey Group
 
 
Table 1: Mean Scores for Five Survey Questions   
              Q1             Q2             Q3                 Q4                Q5 
Baseline 2.29 2.16 1.96 1.82 1.2 
15
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Anger 2.85 2.65 2.39 2.12 1.76 
Fear 2.6 2.7 2.37 2.29 1.75 
Significance 0.001 0.001 0.013 0.017 0.001 
In Bonferroni post-hoc analysis, the statistically significant differences were between the 
baseline group and the other two groups, but not between the anger and fear groups. 
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Table 2:  Differences from the Baseline Mean for Anger and Fear 
Respondents 
          Q1     Q2         Q3  Q4         Q5      
Anger 0.56 0.49 0.43 0.3 0.56      
Fear 0.31 0.54 0.41 0.47 0.55      
Advantage      Anger    Fear     Anger    Fear      Anger      
 
 
The first question had the most significant difference between the fear and anger survey 
takers, though these findings were not statistically significant (p=0.334).  The anger survey 
response, which stated that ethnic profiling of Arabs and Muslims should be acceptable at 
airports, got the most robust response to all questions.  This finding supports previous research 
stating that people are willing to give up the civil liberties of minority groups rather than their 
own liberties.57  Further supporting this point, the fear response here: "sometimes it is necessary 
to give up some individual rights to make it easier for our government to combat terrorism" got 
the second weakest of all the responses. For Question 2, the fear response, "torturing terror 
suspects only antagonizes our enemies and therefore should not be practiced," got a similar 
response to the anger response, "torture is admissible if it will produce information pertinent to 
national security."  Here fear and anger were basically at a wash—with fear having a slight edge. 
Turning our attention to Question 3, which measured whether war is the best way to deal with 
terrorists, responses showed that the anger and fear responses were almost even.  "War is the best 
way to deal with terrorists since the only thing they seem to understand is violence," the anger 
response, got a fair response as did the fear statement: "bringing our troops home immediately 
and putting a stop to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan is the best way to decrease terrorist 
attacks." For Question 4, the anger response got the lowest result of an answer on either emotion-
17
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testing survey.  “In the long run, the benefits of the war on terrorism outweigh the costs to the 
American people” got a response rate of only 0.3 over the baseline.  By contrast, the costs of the 
war on terrorism outweighing the benefits got 0.47. Next, in response to the terror threat being 
elevated, respondents gave strong fear and anger replies. Slightly more people said that the terror 
threat alert being elevated focused them on their enemies and made them want to help the 
authorities in any way possible. However, the fear response was also strong: many respondents 
also said that elevation of the threat alert level, made them worry about the welfare of themselves 
and their family. Finally, an index variable was created by adding up all of the statements from 
all five questions that each respondent agreed. The index variable was meant to measure the 
overall fear or anger response of a given respondent. On the index variable, the baseline group 
averaged 9.43 statements agreed with (out of a possible 15) while the anger group agreed with 
11.72 (out of a possible 20) and the fear group agreed with 11.70 (out of a possible 20).  That 
means that the average respondent to the anger and fear surveys agreed with about 2.3 of the 
extra response options. 
Discussion 
 Anger and fear received equally strong responses from survey respondents in response to 
the terrorism video and survey.  The importance of anger in determining responses to terrorism 
was supported by strong support for ethnic profiling of Arabs and Muslims, support for torture of 
terrorists, support for war against terrorists, and a feeling that raised threat alert levels focused 
respondents on "our enemies."  The weakest link came in one of the theorized outcomes of 
anger: willingness to take risks.  Respondents generally did not think that the benefits of the war 
on terror outweighed the costs, though this could be because the survey was conducted at a time 
when the so-called war on terror has been dragging on for almost nine years.  The second 
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weakest response rate was for the statement on war being the only way to deal with terrorists. 
The importance of fear in determining responses to terrorism was supported by responses 
about the costs of going to war outweighing the benefits (risk averseness), respondents feeling 
worried about themselves or family members when the threat alert level was raised, and torture 
only serving to antagonize our enemies. Like with anger, the response on war was mild.  In this 
case, it was bringing troops home that got a mild response.  The weakest response for fear, 
however, came with the statement that sometimes we need to give up civil liberties to help the 
government combat terrorism.  In sum, both fear and anger got some support, but neither had 
overwhelming support.  This fact is most plainly shown by the index variable outcome which 
shows that a shade less than half of the "test" questions were answered by respondents on 
average and that the fear and anger surveys yielded nearly identical overall scores. 
Similar results were achieved by Kim who conducted a similar study in 2009. His work 
on the role of anger and fear in pushing policy support after terror attacks showed anger having 
an indirect effect on people's support for counterterror policies. Kim's study was built upon 
surveys that attempted to elicit angry and fearful responses in individuals. Like in this study, 
Kim found fear and anger work together to elicit support for counterterror policy or anti-
immigrant responses. The limitations of Kim's study are the same as ours—time elapsed since 
terror incidents occurred and the experimental setting blunts the emotional impact of terror 
attacks and makes studies challenging to carry out.58 
These results allow us to answer the questions posed at the outset of the study. Anger—
alongside fear—is an essential variable for the study of terrorism reactions. It helps explain 
support for ethnic profiling, torture, and war, and a binary view of the world as being populated 
by allies and enemies. These insights are critical to understanding responses to terrorism and 
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need to be better integrated into terrorism research—a revised model for how terror reactions 
work can be seen in the below chart. 
Policy Implications 
The findings of this study have implications for how the public views issues related to 
terrorism. As discussed above both fear and anger were identified as influencing responses to 
terrorism with strong support for the ethnic profiling of Arabs and Muslims, torturing terrorism 
suspects, and supporting the war on terror. These findings provide support for policies geared 
towards more aggressive anti-terrorism strategies which have become increasingly popular with 
the public post 9/11. As policymakers continue to balance the needs of public safety, counter-
terrorism, and civil liberties findings such as these may be referenced as a gauge of what the 
public may be willing to compromise in the interest of safety. Utilizing a sample of college 
students may be telling of what these future policymakers will view as appropriate responses to 
terrorism in the coming years. 
This study may also provide guidance as to how emotional reactions shape public 
demands of policymakers, even if those responses are not the most judicious or grounded in solid 
empirical science. Policy makers need to gauge to what degree they will incorporate public 
views into policy, as well as the influence fear and anger may have on the perceptions of 
terrorism responses. Results of this study may also be utilized as proxies for understanding the 
public's attitudes towards limiting the rights of suspected terrorists or those convicted of 
terrorism. 
Limitations/Future Research 
 This study was a pilot study and attempted to extend the understanding of the emotional 
responses to terrorism by examining the anger and fear based responses of a sample of students. 
Although this study provides some significant findings and lays the foundation for future studies, 
20





it does have some limitations. First, the nature of our convenience sample limits generalizability. 
Results would only apply to similar student samples at similar institutions. However, as a pilot 
study, our findings allowed us to present some quick results, laying the foundation for a more 
comprehensive, national, randomized sample. Second, the size of the sample, while appropriate 
for the analyses presented and reflective of what is typically used in pilot or exploratory studies 
is relatively small compared to larger, national based surveys. The sample size limited the types 
of analyses that could be conducted, but still, support the use of the survey on a larger scale 
study. Finally, the survey data was collected in 2010, as such scenarios describing more recent 
terrorist attacks (e.g., Paris 2015, Ariana Grande Concert 2017) were not presented. 
The findings of this study suggest that emotional responses to terrorism are an essential 
area of inquiry in the social sciences. As terrorism continues to plague society, studies need to 
explore the long-term influence of these attacks on the public's emotional responses. This calls 
for the use of longitudinal surveys exploring these issues with national samples, and this would 
allow scholars and policymakers to have a better understanding of how trends in terrorism 
including new attacks, rising or changing terrorist groups, or inactivity/lack of terrorist attacks 
shape the public's emotional responses. Future studies may also want to target respondents across 
the political spectrum, as mentioned above those with a conservative orientation may not have 
been adequately represented in this study. 
Conclusion 
 The literature on terrorism is replete with discussions of fears and threats evoked by 
terrorists, and this is an artifice of the term "terrorism," and of its history beginning with 
Robespierre's "Reign of Terror" during the French Revolution.59 While terrorists may try to 
instill fear in their target populations, anger's role in our responses to terror—and terrorists' 
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goals—is also a critical factor. Indeed, in our survey, students were just as angry as they were 
fearful of terrorism. The black flag of ISIS may invoke fear, but its many atrocities also are 
meant to make us angry so that we enter into conflicts haphazardly. An angry response to 
terrorism would probably be a disproportionate one, and terrorist recruitment feeds on the 
injustices and grievances wrought by civilian deaths and foreign occupation. Understanding that 
anger is as vital as fear in our responses to terror helps explain terrorist behavior as well as that 
of their targeted governments and populations, and hopefully can give credence to more 
calculated responses to terror attacks. Many people are fond of saying that a fearful response to 
terrorism, such as avoiding trains, means "the terrorists win." We should also note that "the 
terrorists win" when governments and populations respond with anger.  
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